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ABSTRACT ■ The accession to the European Union of new member states
from central and eastern Europe, with weak trade union movements, poorly
developed social dialogue and inferior working conditions, has been viewed
as a threat to regulated labour standards in the EU-15. This article examines a
high-profile labour dispute arising from the conditions of Latvian construction
contract labour in Sweden. The dispute exposes weaknesses in the
protective floor of minimum standards offered by the posted workers
Directive. It also goes to the core of the debate about the preservation of a
‘European social model’ and the proposed Services Directive.
KEYWORDS: EU enlargement ■ European social model ■ posted workers
Directive ■ labour standards ■ industrial disputes ■ construction industry
Introduction: ‘Swedish laws in Sweden’
Between November 2004 and February 2005, angry Swedish construc-
tion workers, holding placards proclaiming ‘Swedish laws in Sweden,’
blockaded an old school undergoing renovation in a Stockholm suburb.
They were protesting at the employment on the site of low-wage Latvian
construction workers. The dispute demonstrates in microcosm the major
challenges facing labour regulation in the expanded EU. It exposes the
fragile nature of hard-won labour standards in the face of economic liber-
alization, deregulation and European enlargement.
The dispute analysed here goes to the very heart of the inherent contra-
diction in the European political project, between the free movement of
labour and capital and the increasingly contested and precarious preser-
vation of a European ‘social model’, with the promise of a guaranteed
floor of rights for workers throughout the EU (Vaughan-Whitehead,
2003). The acquis communautaire receives its standard-setting potential
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from Community legislation such as the posted workers Directive, one
of the key issues of contention during this dispute. Yet Europe’s ‘social
dimension’ would appear to be in danger of crumbling within months of
enlargement, heralding the predicted ‘race to the bottom’ in labour stan-
dards (Kvist, 2004). The implications of this dispute suggest it is the first
gust in a cold, possibly poisonous, ‘eastern’ wind blowing across the
industrial relations landscape of the new Europe.
Methodology
The research for the current article was conducted by the authors, who
are currently based in the Baltic region. Extensive use has been made of
local and regional press sources, including those of Latvia and Sweden.
Other documentary sources include industry statements from employers
and trade union organizations in each country, as well as letters and docu-
ments of relevant governmental authorities. Where possible, to facilitate
reader access, references are made to English-language sources. The focus
on a single dispute is justified as a strategic case study, the first of its kind
in the recent post-enlargement context. It is more than a mere ‘blip’ on
the smooth trajectory of emerging European industrial relations. The
arrival of the new member states from central and eastern Europe (CEE)
poses considerable obstacles for any high-road ‘convergence’ in
European industrial relations (Kohl and Platzer, 2004). Detailed empiri-
cal examination of the ‘export’ of some of the more problematic aspects
of post-communist labour organization has been relatively neglected thus
far. Consideration of the challenges these may pose to the future of regu-
lated labour markets in Europe is overdue.
The specific impacts of labour mobility on labour regulation and
national bargaining systems in the European construction industry have
been analysed by Druker and Dupré (1998), and more recently, in
relation to the new member states, by Clarke et al. (2003) and Sandberg
et al. (2004). However, while many of the issues discussed here were
prefigured in the context of the earlier ‘enlargement’ which incorporated
East Germany, the Swedish–Latvian labour conflict reveals a new poten-
tial vulnerability in existing labour standards. The impact of the posted
workers Directive in the sensitive area of the mobility of construction
workers goes to the core of the problems discussed here (Cremers and
Donders, 2005).
The article begins with a short analysis of the two contrasting trajec-
tories of Sweden, an advanced social democracy, and Latvia, one of the
most enthusiastic exponents of neo-liberal policies in post-communist
eastern Europe. We describe the course of the dispute, with emphasis on
its rapid politicization into a contest between the two governments. Key
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issues raised by the dispute are the application of the posted workers
Directive in relation to service providers from new member states, the
transposition of this Directive in the context of Swedish national
provisions, and finally, the threat of an emerging ‘race to the bottom’ in
labour standards in the EU-25.
Exploiting Comparative Advantage Between States
Geographical proximity aside, Sweden and Latvia could not be more
different. Sweden is a model of Nordic social-democratic inclusiveness
and developed civil society, in which organized labour has a central, legit-
imized role. Neo-liberal Latvia is the most impoverished of the new
member states from the CEE (Dennis and Guio, 2003; Russell and
Whelan, 2004) and displays a whole legacy of problems, including polar-
izing ethnic relations, growing social inequality, significant levels of
corruption and, not least, poor working conditions (Antila and Ylöstalo,
2003; Zepa, 2004). Both countries share an older Baltic history and
Latvia’s capital, Riga, was once part of the Swedish empire; but their
experience diverged significantly once Latvia became part of the Russian
empire, and especially with the upheavals of the 20th century.
Sweden’s modern prosperity has resulted from a combination of social
cohesion, high productivity and high wages. While upward wage pressure
stimulated increased productivity, labour and business cooperated to
ensure that a balance was achieved between wages, investment and profits
that would fuel growth and prosperity. Rising wages forced managers and
entrepreneurs to organize production and services more effectively and
efficiently. That process translated into both economic growth and the
expansion of democracy, including the strong rights of labour to free
collective bargaining (Elvander, 2002; Stokke and Thörnqvist, 2001).
Organized labour contributed to affluence by demanding more of the
goods they produced and the right to make them under humane
conditions. It took the more efficient deployment of labour to achieve
the economic ‘miracle’ of the post-1945 era and to consolidate these
gains, rather than an inefficient global chase to find the world’s cheapest
wages (Palley, 1998).
By contrast, Latvia’s post-Soviet inheritance has left it with uncertain
prospects for economic development. Among the new market econom-
ies, Latvia has adopted some of the most neo-liberal policies in order to
attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Its standard rate of corporate
income tax was reduced in January 2004 to 15 percent, among the lowest
in Europe and the source of some disquiet in the EU-15 (Latvian Invest-
ment and Development Agency, 2004); in the EU-25, only Cyprus and
Ireland have lower rates. This strategy succeeded in attracting incoming
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foreign investment, at least in the short term, with Latvia ranking sixth
among the new member states in the volume of FDI per capita (though
some of this figure represents funds returning from foreign tax havens
utilized by Latvian firms) and achieving a GDP growth rate of nearly 9
percent in 2004 (Republic of Latvia, 2004). FDI is viewed as essential for
the economy because Latvia produces so much less than it consumes,
with a current account deficit also of 9 percent (IMF, 2004).
In the political and ideological vacuum of post-communism, the neo-
liberal paradigm has seemed an attractive option in the CEE region,
especially in the Baltic States (OECD, 2003): the advance of the ‘Wash-
ington consensus’ in the former Soviet bloc has appeared unstoppable
(Gowan, 1999). Latvia’s political and business elites seem intent on main-
taining a subservience to the ‘American way’ (also demonstrated by
participation in the war in Iraq) that risks parodying Latvia’s subordina-
tion to Moscow during the Soviet era. With the future path of economic
development so compromised, and being unable to match the flood of
FDI inflows and advanced technology from abroad, the temptation for
domestic entrepreneurs to seek an easier road through cut-price labour
and intensive subcontracting is seductive. The compulsion to exercise this
comparative advantage in the wider European context, as in the case to
be analysed here, will doubtless continue its powerful pull in the context
of the enlarged EU.
In Latvia today, trade union membership is estimated (probably opti-
mistically) as 20 percent of the workforce and is overwhelmingly concen-
trated in the public sector (38 percent, as against 8 percent in the private
sector). This is somewhat higher than in many other post-Soviet states,
or for that matter the USA, but significantly below the European average,
and far below the Swedish rate of more than 80 percent (EIROnline,
2004b). Despite some evidence of underlying support for trade unionism
and occasional outbursts of militancy, organized labour in Latvia is on
the defensive (Antila and Ylöstalo, 2004: 16; EIROnline, 2004f, 2004g).
At the level of ‘peak organizations’, as elsewhere in the new market econ-
omies of CEE, organized labour has until now been entrapped in a tri-
partite, corporatist ‘social dialogue’. This has mainly served to secure
social peace during the process of neo-liberal reconstruction and has
probably inhibited the development of ‘bipartite’ social dialogue at work-
place and sectoral levels (Mailand and Due, 2004; Ost, 2000).
The representational weakness of labour is compounded by a substan-
tial ‘informal’ or ‘hidden’ economy. ‘Envelope wages’ often comprise the
chief form of payment, as in most CEE states, resulting in significant
levels of ‘undeclared’ pay. One indication of the scale of this phenom-
enon is the relatively low level of declared pay in the private sector in
Latvia: on average, it is 21.4 percent lower than in the public sector; while
in sectors such as construction, where undeclared work is traditional, the
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disparity is even greater (32.5 percent) (EIROnline, 2004a). Labour
protection standards are non-existent in the ‘grey/black’ economies,
which are variously estimated to range between 15 percent and 45 percent
of total employment in Latvia, and at a conservative minimum to account
for around 18 percent of GDP, among the highest in the new member
states (EIROnline, 2004e; Renooy et al., 2004). Such ‘undeclared work’
is typically insecure, and is a continuous threat to the establishment of
more permanent, regulated employment contracts. All of these problems,
as in other new member states, are of particular importance in the
construction sector, where collective labour relations have largely disin-
tegrated (Clarke et al., 2003).
Industrial fatality rates in Latvia are currently the highest in the EU-
25 (Eurostat, 2004), and in the construction industry are roughly three
times the EU average. Accident rates are rising, a consequence according
to the authorities of ‘inadequate organization of work within companies,
poor division of working hours, badly organized rest periods, over-
exertion, stress, arguments and disputes’ (EIROnline, 2004c). Survey
evidence also indicates generally uncongenial working conditions in the
Baltic states, with Latvia again a particularly poor performer (Antila and
Ylöstalo, 2003; European Foundation, 2002). While employers have
pursued profitability since the introduction of the market economy,
workers have ranked employment security and wages over health and
safety (Woolfson et al., 2003). Employers do not necessarily regard good
health and safety as ‘good business’: externalization of the costs of injury
and illness is all too easy an option. The state labour inspectorate, despite
some recent improvements, is underresourced (EIROnline, 2004d).
Swedish construction workers therefore perceived the arrival of Latvian
contract workers on their doorstep as a threat to their hard-won wages,
working conditions, and safety standards. This uncomfortable clash of
histories and expectations was played out in front of a Stockholm school.
The Industrial Dispute
The origin of the dispute between the Latvian construction company,
Laval un Partneri, and the Swedish trade unions stems from a municipal
contract worth nearly €2.8 million to refurbish a school and build an
annex in the Stockholm suburb of Vaxholm. The Latvian company, acting
through a subsidiary (L&P Baltic Bygg AB, registered in Sweden) won
the contract in open competition with Swedish firms. The company was
not a signatory to the Swedish Construction Federation collective agree-
ment with Byggnads, the powerful construction union with more than
100,000 members and close links to the Swedish social-democratic
political establishment. The collective agreement for the sector is the most
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centralized industry-wide agreement in Sweden. Companies that are
not members of the employers’ organization can sign an ‘application
agreement’ (Cremers and Donders, 2005: 52). Byggnads concludes
around 1500 local collective agreements every year, 98 of these with
foreign companies in 2004. Byggnads also took action against 21
companies which refused to conclude a collective agreement, 9 of which
were foreign companies (Byggnads, 2004a).
Laval un Partneri has used Latvian labour to undertake various
construction contracts in Sweden since 2002. In 2004, the company again
imported Latvian labour, reportedly paying the 14 workers Skr80 (less
than €9) per hour. Swedish workers could expect Skr130–145 (€15–16)
per hour under the construction industry collective agreement; employ-
ers must also pay 12.8 percent holiday pay on top of the total wage. Laval
un Partneri claimed to be paying its workers roughly twice what they
would receive in Latvia, and in addition to their monetary pay, provided
the workers with free accommodation, three meals a day, and transport.
The company was reportedly willing to increase the agreed rate to Skr105
(nearly €12) per hour; the unions insisted, however, that the rate should
be within the normal collectively bargained range for Swedish workers
(European Employment Observatory, 2004).
The local section of Byggnads began negotiations with the company in
early June 2004, arguing that the terms of the Swedish national agreement
should apply, and the company at first said it would consider this. There-
after, the parties met periodically, but without progress. On 14 Septem-
ber, the day before the fourth meeting, the company announced it had
concluded a collective agreement with the Latvian Building Workers’
Union (LCA), and that therefore no agreement with the Swedish union
was necessary. From the viewpoint of the Latvian union, Laval un
Partneri represented one of the ‘better’ Latvian companies; but the timing
of this agreement suggests an attempt to indulge in a form of ‘pre-emptive
recognition’. At a further meeting in September, the company indicated
it would shortly announce its decision on implementing the terms of the
Swedish collective agreement, but at the beginning of October informed
Byggnads that it was still considering. At this point, the union’s patience
ran out, and on 19 October it announced that it would initiate a blockade
and prevent Swedish specialist services from supplying the site.
The action commenced on 2 November, some five months after the
initial contact with the company (Byggnads, 2004b). The union picket at
the school site continued throughout December 2004. On 2 December,
Byggnads held a rally outside the parliament building in Stockholm to
protest against vocal support for the Latvian position by right-wing
Swedish parliamentarians. On 3 December, the electricians union
(Svenska Elektrikerförbundet) called a solidarity strike. The Swedish
electricians and installation employers’ association duly threatened the
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union with reprisals for undertaking illegal secondary industrial action,
arguing that the electricians had no right to boycott Swedish companies
with signed collective agreements operating at the site. Deliveries of
concrete to the Vaxholm site were also temporarily stopped, although the
company managed to source supplies from a non-union firm. In mid-
December, more than 50 Swedish building workers gathered at the gates
to prevent the Latvian workers from entering. The police were called, but
did not become directly involved, despite appeals by Laval un Partneri to
the police authorities. The dispute, meanwhile, was assuming an increas-
ingly international political dimension.
Escalation
In June 2004, a few days after the dispute commenced, the Latvian deputy
foreign minister met the Swedish ambassador to Latvia to express his
concern. The Swedish government was requested to intervene ‘to elimi-
nate the outright discrimination on the basis of citizenship’ and ‘attempts
to restrict freedom of competition and the free movement of services’ in
the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, 2004). For its part, the
Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications
conveyed the Swedish government’s ‘neutral’ position. Prime Minister
Göran Persson was quoted as saying that the Swedish union had a ‘right
take retaliatory measures’ in order to ensure ‘the survival of collective
agreements’ (Centre for a Social Europe, 2004). As the dispute escalated,
public opinion in both Latvia and Sweden was increasingly aroused, with
accusations against the Swedish trade union of ‘xenophobia’ and of
‘protectionist mafia’ behaviour. Swedish opposition parties, as well as
building industry and employers’ federations in Latvia and Sweden, lined
up to condemn the trade union action (EUobserver, 2004). To counter the
charge of being ‘anti-Latvian’, Byggnads placed a full-page text statement
in the leading Latvian daily newspaper Diena (beneath two hands clasped
in friendship) inviting Latvian workers coming to Sweden to join Swedish
trade unions (Diena, 2005a). The following day, Latvian employers (this
time beneath a closed fist aimed at an open hand) published a full-page
counter-statement, warning Latvian workers that if they followed the
Swedish union’s advice, it could cost jobs (Diena, 2005b). Meanwhile, the
Swedish Conservative Party’s youth organization (MUF) delivered a
severed horse’s head (mocked-up in cloth) to the union’s offices.
From the Latvian side, there were calls for an economic blockade of
Swedish companies in Latvia. The Construction Contractors Association
of Latvia, in a letter to Göran Håkansson, the Swedish Ambassador,
observed: ‘it is understandable that “old” EU member countries wish to
protect their market from cheap East European workforces. They
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shouldn’t forget, however, that Latvia and other new member countries
wish for the same’ (Dienas Bizness, 2004). Latvian trade unions, organ-
ized in Latvijas Briı¯vo Arodbiedrı¯bu Savienı¯ba (Free Trade Union Con-
federation of Latvia or LBAS), were also critical (IFBWW, 2004); their
Chair, Pe¯teris Krı¯gers, expressed mystification that the Swedish unions
had not contacted their Latvian colleagues prior to taking industrial
action. Henceforth, it was agreed that bilateral communications would be
strengthened, but the damage had been done. Perhaps, had the Latvian
union confederation taken anything other than a ‘national’ position, it
would have been pilloried domestically for ‘disloyalty’, especially in view
of its communist past.
The Latvian authorities continued their involvement at the highest level
throughout the dispute, claiming that EU rules on the free movement of
services were being ignored and barriers were being placed on free compe-
tition in the internal market. Though this dispute was not directly inspired
by the proposed ‘Bolkestein’ Directive on the liberalization of services, it
may have reinforced the determination of the Latvian authorities to use
the Laval case to prise open new markets in the EU. In early December
2004, the government set up an inter-ministerial working group headed
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and involving representatives of the
Ministries of Economy, Justice, and Welfare. The group concluded that
the dispute constituted a breach of EU rules, and the government accord-
ingly proposed to ask the European Commission to evaluate whether
Sweden had infringed the EU Treaty. By mid-December, the Latvian
Prime Minister, Aigars Kalvı¯tis, had raised the matter with the Swedish
premier at an EU summit in Brussels, and personally appealed to the
president of the Commission in a letter expressing ‘deep concern’
(Kalvı¯tis, 2004). The government also announced that it might pursue the
matter at the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
On 7 December, Laval un Partneri applied to the Swedish Labour
Court, claiming that the industrial action and blockade were illegal, as
was the sympathy strike of the electricians’ union. They requested a
ruling that the blockade should be lifted, and an award of damages made.
In the third week of December, the court delivered its interim finding:
‘actions like this aimed at pushing through an add-on to the leading
collective agreement within the industry, cannot be seen as going against
good labour market practices’ (EUbusiness, 2004). Hans Tilly, Chair of
Byggnads, welcomed the ruling:
For us it has been obvious the whole time that Swedish rules and laws
should apply for everyone in the Swedish labour market, regardless of
what country they come from . . . The Labour Court’s decision today
clarifies that the Latvian [collective] agreement will not block us from
continuing our actions aimed at getting Laval un Partneri to sign a
Swedish collective agreement. (EUbusiness, 2004)
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Lawyers for the company intimated that they would seek to appeal, while
Diena reported promises by Tilly to escalate the industrial action in the
New Year:
We expected such a verdict, anything else would be unacceptable. We will
continue the blockade until the company sign the collective work
contract. We have the right to use the blockade as a sanction against
companies that refuse to cooperate with us and we will certainly expand
the blockade. It is a good feeling that we can carry on our traditions and
protect workers from insatiable companies. The blockade will involve
industrial, metalworking, woodworking, transport and construction
trade-unions, as well as the union of (building maintenance) tradesmen.
(Diena, 2004)
The dispute also took on an international trade union character. The
10-million-strong International Federation of Building and Wood
Workers (IFBWW) launched a solidarity campaign, issuing a letter of
protest to be sent to the Latvian government, to Laval un Partneri, and
to Svenskt Näringsliv (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise). In early
January 2005, as the trade unions intensified their boycott, Laval un
Partneri declared that they were not prepared to give up their operations
in Sweden, despite considerable financial losses (Baltic Times, 2005;
LETA, 2004). The dispute seemed set to become even more intractable.
One month later, however, as trade union pressure on the company
mounted, and the Vaxholm municipality became increasingly concerned
over contract completion, Laval un Partneri announced their withdrawal
from Sweden. Though the municipality offered to pay the company for
work carried out up to the point at which the blockade had commenced,
the firm had reportedly suffered considerable losses, their Swedish
subsidiary filing for bankruptcy (Dienas Bizness, 2005a).
The Posted Workers Directive and Transitional
Arrangements
At first glance, this looked like a victory for Swedish organized labour.
However, the dispute has exposed underlying weaknesses in the appli-
cation of European labour regulation, which could produce different
outcomes in the context of a weaker labour movement. The crucial issue
is the interpretation of the 1996 EU Directive (96/71/EC), which stipu-
lates that workers ‘posted’ by an employer to perform work in another
EU state should be guaranteed the minimum provisions laid down by law
or collective agreement in the host country. The meaning is straight-
forward in countries where core employment conditions are specified by
statute or in agreements which are given universal applicability by law
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(erga omnes). Where (as in Sweden) this is not the case, the Directive
(Article 3.8) enables a country to specify as the minimum the terms of
‘collective agreements which have been concluded by the most represen-
tative employers’ and labour organizations at national level, and which
are applied throughout the national territory’.
This provision recognizes the distinctive character of the Scandinavian
labour market model, which rests on voluntary collective agreements
without erga omnes procedures, and was regarded as a major victory for
trade unions in Sweden and Denmark. This issue was on the table during
Sweden’s EU application negotiations in 1994–95 and resulted in a decla-
ration, annexed to the accession agreement, which stated that Sweden
could maintain its labour market model. Accordingly, collective agree-
ments in themselves were held to be an adequate method of implement-
ing Community law in Sweden.
The Directive was transposed into Swedish legislation through the
1999 Posting of Workers Act, which set out a list of the rules that must
be observed by all employers, whether established within or outside the
EU (Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications Sweden,
1999). This list corresponds to that given in the Directive (Article 3.1),
except that there are no rules corresponding to the latter’s provisions
regarding minimum rates of pay laid down by law or collective agree-
ment, and on terms and conditions in collective agreements for the
building sector (EMIRE, n.d. a, n.d. b). Swedish trade unions seek to
guarantee minimum wages and holiday pay entitlements exclusively
through collective bargaining. If necessary, such collective agreements
could be defended through industrial action in order to prevent ‘social
dumping’ (Rönngren, 2005: 2).
The issue of social dumping arose directly in the context of heightened
sensitivities after EU enlargement. LO Vice-President Erland Olausson
warned that the Laval dispute: ‘concerns the entire Swedish labour
market. Every worker will be affected if dumping of Swedish salaries is
permitted . . . We do not accept social dumping which is competition on
the lowest level of salary and working conditions’ (EUobserver, 2004).
However, the issue of social dumping has been the subject of a long-
standing concern in Sweden following the portside boycott of a flag-of-
convenience vessel with a poorly paid Filipino crew, the MS Britannia.
This resulted in a 1989 Labour Court judgment severely restricting
‘industrial action aimed at replacing or amending an existing collective
agreement applicable to a given workplace . . . even if the union taking
such action was not bound by the agreement concerned’ (EMIRE, n.d. a,
n.d. b). The judgment made the ban on industrial action applicable to
both Swedish and foreign employment relationships. After intense trade
union lobbying, an amendment to the 1976 Co-Determination Act was
enacted in 1991. Popularly known as Lex Britannia (EMIRE, n.d. a, n.d.
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b), this gave Swedish trade unions the right to take collective action, such
as boycotts and blockades, in connection with employment relationships
which are not governed by Swedish law (for example, in respect of the
activities of a foreign enterprise temporarily working in Sweden) if the
unions consider this a case of social dumping. Such action was allowed
even if the union in question had no members at the site or enterprise,
and even if there was a valid collective agreement applicable to the
workers’ or the company’s home country. In practice, Lex Britannia
provided the means for Swedish trade unions to enforce the posted
workers Directive, and the conflict with Laval un Partneri must be seen
against this background. In sum, Swedish practice attempts to reconcile
EU Directives with a non-statutory approach to labour market regu-
lation. This is a significant strength, if based on continuing high levels of
union density, but also a potential weakness in the context of diminish-
ing collective bargaining power. The Laval dispute highlighted the fact
that, with no minimum wage legislation or universally binding collective
agreements, a foreign company could argue that there was no obligation
upon it to pay a specified wage.
A problematic feature in the host-state application of the posted
workers Directive, highlighted by the dispute, is its potential incompat-
ibility with the EU Treaty provisions (Article 49, formerly Article 59)
giving enterprises the right to engage freely in the cross-border provision
of services. A firm which has to comply with labour standards reflecting
the host state’s higher wages and standards of labour protection could
claim that it is being denied a basic freedom endowed in the EU Treaty,
and at the same time placed at an ‘unfair’ competitive disadvantage. ECJ
case law began to deal with these matters in the early 1990s. The first
notable ruling, issued in March 1990 (ECJ, case C-113/89, Rush
Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417/12), concerned a Portuguese-owned
public works company which had been subcontracted to build a railway
line in France. The ECJ ruled that the company had the right (based on
freedom to provide services guaranteed by the Treaty) to carry out the
contract using its own Portuguese workers. However, it also ruled that
French social and labour legislation was applicable to the contract and
that France therefore had the right to extend collective agreements to
foreign enterprises temporarily carrying out work in France. To clarify
this principle and, in part, to moderate the wide-ranging nature of this
judgment, the Commission subsequently issued its Directive on posted
workers (Davies, 2002). In the intervening years, as the case law has
expanded, the Commission has sought to keep the implementation of the
provisions of the Directive under review, although so far without propos-
ing amendments (EC, 2003).
A further difficulty has involved the so-called ‘transitional arrange-
ments’ with regard to the free movement of labour within an enlarged EU.
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Posted workers are only temporarily working in another member state,
remaining employed in their home state, and thus are not ‘mobile’ in the
sense that transitional arrangements address. Nevertheless, there is a
perception of labour ‘leakage’ into the receiving country’s labour market,
which means that the two areas of policy are increasingly intertwined in
the minds of political and economic actors. In reality, the notion that
posted workers ‘do not enter the host state labour market’ is often little
more than a legal fiction. At ‘site level’ the provisions of the posted
workers Directive are often not observed, and practical enforcement is
difficult. Transitional arrangements to limit the inflow of labour from the
new member states currently exist in most EU-15 countries for a two-year
period following enlargement. However, the issue is highly sensitive, and
poses a massive dilemma for the Commission and national governments.
At the end of the transitional period, member states must notify the
Commission as to their intentions for the next three years, either to
maintain measures to limit inflows or to permit free movement of labour.
By 2009, the Commission expects to achieve the free movement of
workers on a Europe-wide basis. A current member state can apply for
authorization to continue national measures for a further two years, but
only if the requirement can be ‘objectively justified’. In any event, by 2011,
seven years after the 2004 enlargement, complete freedom of movement of
labour must be guaranteed (EC, 2002; European Commission Memo,
2004; Turmann and Carrera, 2004). These transitional arrangements do not
apply to certain categories of persons, for example, those wishing to study
in an existing member state or those seeking to establish themselves as
‘self-employed’ persons. Moreover, transitional periods do not apply to
the free movement of services, including posted workers; and in Austria
and Germany, the exemption from transitional arrangements is specifically
removed from labour in the construction sector. In this context, a lack of
definitional clarity in national law on the question of employment status,
especially with regard to the notionally ‘self-employed’, remains a key
weakness of the posted workers Directive and further complicates the
issue (Cremers and Donders, 2005: 138–9).
For the Swedish authorities, the Laval dispute poses acute difficulties,
in addition to the vulnerabilities it revealed in the national transposition
of the posted workers Directive. Sweden was one of the few member
states not to restrict the future free movement of labour, but could
certainly now ask the Commission to impose such restrictions. It would
then be up to the Commission to decide what restrictions, and for which
period, might be allowed. The Swedish authorities may be forced to
follow the Austrian and German route of seeking a specific further
exclusion of the notionally ‘self-employed’ in construction, especially if
new member state employers attempt to circumvent additional restric-
tions. For each actor, however, there are costs in pursuing whichever
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strategy is adopted. For the European project as a whole, this seemingly
small labour dispute could potentially undermine much of the legitimacy
that has been created for a viable identity of ‘European citizenship’ in the
post-communist member states, reinforcing their perception of ‘second-
class’ citizenship.
Race to the Bottom?
A number of questions which arise from the dispute are troubling, but
perhaps unanswerable. Why was the Laval tender accepted by a Swedish
public authority in the first place (when it must have been clear that
Swedish collective agreement conditions were not to be applied)? Why
were the Latvian authorities so eager to become involved at the highest
levels from the very inception of the dispute? How could a relatively
small contractor survive such a protracted dispute (without at least some
form of political and financial encouragement)? Some argue that the
dispute was stoked up by the Swedish and Latvian employers, and the
Latvian authorities, using Latvian workers as a pawn.
Even as the Laval episode was unfolding, trade union pressure forced
an Estonian labour agency based in Stockholm to withdraw two Estonian
workers who were employed at a ski resort and paid less than half the
minimum wage of Swedish workers. At around the same time, a Lithuan-
ian construction company, Atkirta, abandoned a project in Denmark
under similar trade union pressure. Neither of these episodes attracted
more than passing attention. The admission by Svenskt Näringsliv that it
funded Laval’s case before the Labour Court to the sum of half a million
kronor (€55,000) (Svenska Dagbladet, 2005) suggests that the Laval
episode provided a convenient point of entry for employers’ organiz-
ations to open up ‘strategic’ long-standing issues of labour market reform
in Sweden (Hamilton, 2005). Meanwhile, in a move that may well be
problematic in terms of EU requirements on free competition, the
Swedish government has intimated that it will prohibit the awarding of
public contracts without an appropriate collective agreement. The
Minister for Local Government and Financial Markets, Sven-Erik
Österberg, told the Swedish media:
We [in Sweden] have a different tradition than what is usual further south
in Europe . . . It is extremely important that we show that we can enforce
the collective agreement in Sweden also in the future . . . In light of among
other things what happened in Vaxholm, this has become very pressing.
(The Local, 2005a)
In a further twist to the saga, the Swedish Labour Court, in an apparent
step back from earlier certainties, has decided to seek a preliminary
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opinion from the ECJ before making its own final ruling on the Laval
case, because European legislation is ‘unclear concerning the issue of
whether the [blockade] actions are compatible with a ban on impeding
the free circulation of services and a ban on discrimination . . . as well as
the directive 96/71/EC on the posting of workers abroad’ (EUbusiness,
2005). Such a ruling may take at least two years to emerge, and therefore
adds to the uncertainties that surround this issue. Meantime, new
disputes involving Latvian construction companies, similar to the Laval
episode, appear to be emerging (The Local, 2005b).
At European level, a group of some 40 assorted Nordic and Baltic
Members of the European Parliament, belonging to the European
People’s Party (Christian Democrats and conservatives), seem deter-
mined that this dispute should remain a cause célèbre. They have sought
an affirmative response from a sympathetic Commission on the question
of the free movement of services and ‘discrimination’ against new
member states (Dienas Bizness, 2005b). Subsequently, EU Internal
Market Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, announced (in advance of a
‘common position’ from the Commission) that he would oppose Sweden
and support Laval’s position when the case comes before the ECJ. This
news caused consternation in Sweden, where the government threatened
to withdraw its previous political support for the draft Services Directive,
and provoked uproar in the European Parliament (EUobserver, 2005a,
2005b, 2005c). The issues raised by Laval have thus become entangled
with the debate on the future Services Directive and the European social
model in general.
Conclusion
It will be tempting for new member states such as Latvia to use their
‘comparative advantage’ in low wages and inferior working conditions to
reach some parity within the liberalized EU. However, any gains would
be short-lived if they depress the wages and working conditions of their
wealthier neighbours. In terms of the protective aspects of the posted
workers Directive, its ‘public policy provisions’ (Article 3.10) are meant
to offer some measure of reassurance that a floor of minimum standards
will be maintained. It is the core provisions of the Directive which are its
ultimate guarantee of efficacy, however, and these now seem to be under
threat. Furthermore, the contentious designation of the ‘country of origin
principle’, in whatever convoluted form it eventually emerges in the
proposed Services Directive, may radically alter the ability to defend
national labour standards, even though workers already covered by the
posted workers Directive will be theoretically subject to specific deroga-
tion in order to prevent social dumping.
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In the first draft at least of the proposed Directive, companies wishing
to provide services in more than one country would be able to operate
according to the rules and regulations of their home country, rather than
those of the host country. Thus companies in existing member states
would potentially be able to bypass strong social and environmental stan-
dards by shifting their operational base to new member states with less
rigorously enforced labour laws and agreements, while new member state
companies would be able to undercut at will. As if to reinforce such fears,
a Latvian recruitment agency Eiropas Eksperti (European Experts)
makes the following offer on its website:
You don’t pay any employers or social taxes for the workers you rent from
us. You also slip employers responsibility, because employer of the
workers is still our company. We send our workers to perform the work at
your company . . . You get highly motivated employees with good
knowledge of English/German. You save 50% or more on salaries if you
compare with the wage you would have to pay to nationals of your
country. We offer our services in whole European Union and especially in
Great Britain, Germany, Netherlands and Nordic countries (Sweden,
Finland, Denmark). Our workers are experienced, hard working, attractive
and mostly work in restaurants and cafes, storehouses, transport
companies, agriculture and construction sectors. But even workers in IT
and other areas can be offered. Make your company more competitive and
discover the opportunities new EU has to offer! (Eiropas Eksperti, 2005)
There is a reply form on the website which interested enquirers can e-
mail to Eiropas Eksperti, complete with tick-boxes to list the number and
type of workers required.
Today, the challenges of labour mobility and European integration are
vexing. The contention of Laval un Partneri that it has a right to enter
Swedish labour markets by virtue of adhering to Latvian labour law and
the ‘freedoms’ of the internal market is a threat to labour rights in Sweden
and, such as they are, in Latvia. This dispute reflects the difference
between advanced democratic societies with strong labour movements
and what, despite the sustained efforts of many in the Baltic States, are
still often electoral oligarchies in which labour rights are routinely sacri-
ficed in the search for economic prosperity. The current imbalance of
power in post-communist states such as Latvia, in which organized
labour is largely silent (or indeed silenced), makes for potentially insur-
mountable obstacles to the achievement of modern European-style
industrial relations. The notion of labour as a legitimized ‘social partner’
with the right to engage freely in collective bargaining is daily contra-
dicted both in law and practice. While the mutual participation of social
partners may have contributed to the prosperity experienced by western
Europe after 1945, it is a concept as yet little understood in the new
member states.
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The history of democratic advance has been one of collective reaction
against the raw power of market forces. If organized labour views the
gains of ‘Europeanization’ as largely ephemeral, and merely a pretext for
private power to profit at its expense by initiating a ‘race to the bottom’
in labour standards, it will defend itself both on an international and a
national basis, in so far as it is able to do so, much as Swedish workers
have done. One certainty remains, if the strongest of labour movements,
such as the Swedish trade unions, were to be unable to defend their inter-
ests, this would be a historical setback for the entire European trade
union movement. Even short-term success will not necessarily resolve
underlying issues which inevitably will reappear, perhaps in an even more
destructive form. A likely outcome will be populist resistance to labour
mobility, based on ethnic prejudice.
It could be argued that the Laval episode reveals more about fragilities
in the ‘Scandinavian model’ of labour market regulation, in particular its
incomplete transposition of the posted workers Directive into Swedish
law, than deficiencies in a European social model as such. Given that the
Directive has hitherto been implemented in Sweden (and Denmark) by
collective agreement, such an argument may be persuasive at first glance.
Indeed, the LO has warned that if Sweden is forced to introduce national
minimum wages or legislation to extend the scope of collective agree-
ments, it would mean ‘the end of the Swedish labour market model’
(Rönngren, 2005). In the light of the Vaxholm episode, a broad frame-
work agreement between Swedish employers and the LO on the issue of
incoming foreign labour has now been reached, although this has still to
be developed in sectoral agreements (LO, 2005).
Paradoxically, non-legally binding arrangements based on close
cooperation between the social partners are precisely the model of the
open method of coordination currently evolving at EU level and
strongly encouraged by the Commission. ‘Traditional’ Community
instruments such as Directives are increasingly regarded as an unnecess-
ary ‘burden’ on business and competitiveness, while ‘soft law’, ‘better
regulation’, and voluntary self-regulation by social partners are
promoted as alternative regulatory strategies. Yet as the Laval un
Partneri dispute suggests, even in the most favourable circumstances,
where voluntary collective bargaining arrangements are strongly
entrenched, standards of labour protection are vulnerable without a
supporting architecture of national law. If anything, such vulnerability
is likely to increase as similar disputes arise, both in Sweden and in other
less favourable industrial relations arenas, and as future EU enlargement
intensifies pressures on labour standards. Ultimately, the challenge is not
simply one way, from East to West, but in the reverse direction as well.
The new member states may also have less incentive to modify their
industrial relations frameworks to ensure the active implementation of
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labour rights in line with international standards, adding yet a further
twist to the downward spiral.
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